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Pragmatic and cognitive accounts of figurative language posit a difference between
metaphor and metonymy in terms of underlying conceptual operations. Recently, other
pragmatic uses of words have been accounted for in the Relevance Theory framework,
such as approximation, described in terms of conceptual adjustment that varies in degree
and direction with respect to the case of metaphor. Despite the theoretical distinctions,
there is very poor experimental evidence addressing the metaphor/metonymy distinction,
and none concerning approximation. Here we used meticulously built materials to
investigate the interpretation mechanisms of these three phenomena through timed
sensicality judgments. Results revealed that interpreting metaphors and approximations
differs from literal interpretation both in accuracy and reaction times, with higher difficulty
and costs for metaphors than for approximations. This suggests similar albeit gradual
interpretative costs, in line with the latest account of Relevance Theory. Metonymy, on
the contrary, almost equates literal comprehension and calls for a theoretical distinction
from metaphor. Overall, this work represents a first attempt to provide an empirical basis
for a theory-sound and psychologically-grounded taxonomy of figurative and loose uses of
language.
Keywords: metaphor, figurative language, loose use, pragmatics, sensicality judgments, experimental pragmatics
INTRODUCTION
Word meaning is often modified in use, giving rise to a
number of loose and figurative uses. These modulations of
meaning are thoroughly context-dependent and their descrip-
tion has fallen under the domain of pragmatics. While it
is useful to group together non-literal uses, potential dif-
ferences in the representation and the underlying interpre-
tative mechanisms should be accounted for and considered
experimentally. This paper is concerned with the characteriza-
tion of three pragmatic phenomena, namely metaphor (e.g.,
“Some theses are marathons”), metonymy (e.g., “No com-
ments from Buckingham Palace”), and approximation (e.g.,
“Her face is oval”), and whether they exhibit different inter-
pretation costs, which might support and sharpen theoretical
distinctions.
THEORETICAL ACCOUNTS ON METAPHOR, METONYMY, AND
APPROXIMATION
Existing pragmatic and cognitive accounts differ on whether they
treat different types of pragmatically enriched meanings as dis-
tinct operations or not. In the Gricean framework, figurative
expressions such as metaphor, irony, meiosis, and hyperbole are
grouped together as cases of flouting the first Maxim of Quality
(“Do not say what you believe to be false”), and require the deriva-
tion of an implicature (Grice, 1975). The nature of metonymy is
not explored, but presumably metonymic expressions would also
be described inferentially, either as another case of flouting the
first Maxim of Quality or as a tool to adhere to the Maxim of
Manner (Egg, 2004).
In more recent times, Relevance Theory has deepened the
study of the inferential processes underlying the comprehension
of the lexical items, suggesting that grasping the intended mean-
ing of a word requires a process of adjusting the linguistically
encoded concept to construct an ad hoc concept, i.e., a concept
inferentially derived for that occasion of use, whose denotation
is broader (i.e., more inclusive) or narrower (i.e., less inclusive)
than the denotation of the lexical concept. Consider the utterance
“Boris is a man”: in most contexts the lexically encoded con-
cept MAN would result under informative and would require,
for instance, to be narrowed down to the ad hoc concept
MAN∗ as “ideal man,” in order to reach the intended interpre-
tation. Conversely, in “This policy will bankrupt the farmers,”
the encoded concept BANKRUPT could be taken literally, but
in certain contexts is likely to require an adjustment that goes
in the opposite direction, namely to be broadened in order to
include cases in which the farmers are close enough to bankruptcy
(Carston, 2009).
In this view, most words require an adjustment process result-
ing in an ad hoc concept, and the difference depends on the direc-
tion of the adjustment (broadening or narrowing with respect to
the denotation), and also on the degree of it, ranging from less
to more context-dependent and occasion-specific uses (Wilson,
2003; Sperber and Wilson, 2005; Wilson and Carston, 2006).
Well-studied examples of different degrees of broadening include
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language uses known in the literature with the labels of approx-
imation, hyperbole, and metaphor. Approximation is a variety
of broadening that includes a relatively marginal adjustment of
the encoded concept, to cover just a “penumbra” of cases that
only strictly speaking fall outside the linguistically-specified deno-
tation (e.g., in “The house is empty,” “empty” may be used to
communicate that the house is lacking of furniture). Hyperbole
involves a more substantial adjustment of the encoded concepts
(e.g., “empty” in the previous example is used to communicate
that the house, although furnished, does not have as much fur-
niture as desired). Metaphor is a use of language based on an
evenmore radical broadening of the lexical concept (e.g., “empty”
can be used metaphorically to indicate that the house lacks of
emotional content).
Recently, Carston and Wearing (2011) proposed a finessing
of the relevance-theoretic account, by positing a stronger dis-
tinction between metaphor and hyperbole: while concept broad-
ening is required both in metaphor and hyperbole understand-
ing, metaphorical uses would require also additional concept
narrowing. Consider the following utterances: “My evening jog
with Bill turned into a marathon” and “Writing a thesis was a
marathon Jane didn’t want to repeat.” When intended hyperbol-
ically, as in the first case, the denotation of the ad hoc concept
MARATHON∗ is simply more inclusive (broader) than that of
the original lexical concept, involving a relaxing of the length
of the episode of running. When intended metaphorically, as
in the second example, the word goes through a broadening
(in order to include instances of activities that are psychologi-
cally demanding and exhausting) combined with narrowing (in
order to exclude professional marathons; Carston and Wearing,
2011). Following this idea, it seems reasonable to assume that
also approximation differs from metaphor in requiring only (and
marginally) concept broadening: if a separation holds between
the case of metaphor and the case of a substantial yet not radi-
cal broadening such as hyperbole, the separation should hold also
between metaphor and a marginal broadening like that required
by approximation.
As concerns metonymy, a full description in Relevance Theory
terms is still lacking (for a preliminary account see Papafragou,
1996), and is indeed considered as an interesting challenge for
pragmatics (Carston, 2010). Following Nunberg’s (1995) distinc-
tion between reference transfer (e.g., “The ham sandwich wants
to pay,” where a nominal expression is used to refer to another
nominal expression) and predicate transfer (e.g., “Nixon bombed
Hanoi,” where the shift concerns the whole predicate “bombed
Hanoi”), Wilson and Carston (2007) suggested that both cases
seem to require the construction of an ad hoc concept, but only
the latter case involves broadening and narrowing, while the
former should be accommodated in terms of genuine reference
substitution or a real world association (see also Carston, 2010).
Here we focus on the reference transfer case, and on the idea
that this type of metonymy, while still representing a pragmatic
use that requires the construction of an ad hoc concept, does
not involve the same kind of conceptual adjustment observed for
metaphor. The view that at least some cases of metonymy can
be described as cases of reference transfer—presumably involv-
ing a meaning shift mechanism—is in line with other pragmatic
accounts distinguishing between loosening, meaning shift, and
free enrichment (Recanati, 2010).
Turning to the framework broadly known as Cognitive
Linguistics, both metaphor and metonymy are thought of as
conceptual phenomena grounded in general cognition. Yet a dif-
ference is assumed to characterize the two. Metaphor is described
in terms ofmapping between two distinct cognitive domains (e.g.,
in “Love is a journey,” the source domain JOURNEY is mapped
onto the target domain LOVE). Metonymy, on the contrary, is
based on mapping within the same cognitive domain (e.g., in
“He is reading Shakespeare,” the source domain SHAKESPEARE
provides access to its sub-domain SHAKESPEARE’S WRITINGS,
which is the target domain; Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Ruiz de
Mendoza Ibáñez, 2007). Furthermore, the mapping is taken to be
based on different associative relations: resemblance formetaphor
and contiguity for metonymy. Standard types of metonymicmap-
pings are, among others, part for whole, producer for product, place
for institution, object used for user (Panther and Thornburg, 2007).
This list suggests the routinized status of many metonymic map-
pings, and points in the direction of a close relation between
metonymy and grammar. There are indeed grammatical struc-
tures that seem to be sensitive to metonymically induced inter-
pretations. For example, in “The author began the book,” the
verb’s logical structure coerces an interpretation in which a part
of an event, the book, denotes the whole event, writing the book, a
phenomenon known as “logical metonymy” (Pustejovsky, 1995;
Lascarides and Copestake, 1998).
FORMULATING EMPIRICAL PREDICTIONS
Do the differences among pragmatic uses brought about in the
theoretical literature find experimental support? Evidence from
direct comparison of metaphor and metonymy is sparse. In a
self-paced reading study, Gibbs (1990) showed that metaphor-
ical referential descriptions are understood more easily than
metonymic ones. Developmental psychology, however, points in
a different direction: with respect to metaphor, metonymy is
acquired earlier and processed more accurately (Rundblad and
Annaz, 2010). Similarly, patients exhibit different behaviors in
processing metaphors vs. metonymies, associated with different
lesion sites, which suggests distinct or at least partially indepen-
dent neural representation (Bisiacchi et al., 1976; Semenza et al.,
1980, 1992; Klepousniotou and Baum, 2005).
In considering how different pragmatic uses are processed,
we can nevertheless rely on the extensive literature on metaphor
and—to a lesser extent—metonymy. It has been shown that
metaphor processing is influenced by many factors, such as con-
text, familiarity, difficulty, novelty (Gibbs, 1994; Giora, 2003;
Cardillo et al., 2010). However, when placed in a minimal con-
text and controlled for the other factors, processing metaphor-
ical expressions still requires additional effort measured both
at the behavioral level (Cacciari and Glucksberg, 1994; Noveck
et al., 2001; Bosco et al., 2009) and in terms of brain response
(De Grauwe et al., 2010; Bambini et al., 2011; Bambini and
Resta, 2012). Metonymy, on the contrary, has produced mixed
results. Neurophysiological and neuroimaging evidence for a
difference between metonymy and literal processing has been
reported, although with no visible effects in terms of behavioral
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response (Rapp et al., 2011; Schumacher, 2011). Eye-tracking
studies showed no differences compared to literal interpretations
when metonymies are licensed by the context and mediated by
a common metonymic convention (Frisson and Pickering, 1999;
Frisson, 2009). Schumacher (2013) suggests even fine-grained
distinctions between metonymic types. As for approximation, to
the best of our knowledge it hasn’t received empirical consider-
ation up to now. However, it has been shown that other types
of loose use, such as hyperbole, are read faster than metaphor
(Deamer et al., 2010), lending support to the gradient of meaning
extension.
From the perspective of experimental pragmatics (Noveck
and Reboul, 2008), we attempted to formulate empirical predic-
tions out of the cognitive pragmatic accounts discussed above.
Following Relevance Theory, metaphor and approximation are
the result of the same conceptual adjustment process, differ-
ing solely in the degree and in the direction of this pro-
cess. Approximation involves only a marginal broadening, while
metaphor involves a wider broadening (Wilson, 2003) or broad-
ening coupled with narrowing (Carston and Wearing, 2011). In
this sense, metaphor seems to require more meaning modu-
lation than approximation. It may be hypothesized that more
meaning modulation would require higher costs of interpreta-
tion, thus, predicting: (i) higher interpretation costs for metaphor
and approximation in comparison with literal expressions; (ii)
higher interpretation costs for metaphor in comparison with
approximation.
Metonymy, on the contrary, seems to rely on specific mecha-
nisms. The hypothesis—to a certain extent shared by Relevance
Theory, Cognitive Linguistics, and other frameworks—is that
metonymy is supported by conceptual processes different from
those involved in metaphor processing, such as meaning shift
operations within the same conceptual domain. Re-formulating
in processing terms, our prediction is that (iii) metonymy could
exhibit different interpretation costs with respect to metaphor
and approximation. More specifically, based on previous devel-
opmental and neuropsychological evidence, metonymic inter-
pretation could come with no extra cost with respect to literal
comprehension, at least when the transfer type is routinized (e.g.,
producer for product).
In order to provide empirical evidence in favor of either a dis-
tinction or a unified view of the three phenomena, we compared
interpretation availability and costs for metaphor, metonymy, and
approximation through a timed sensicality judgment paradigm,
where participants are asked to decide quickly if a sentence is
meaningful or not, and their performance is measured in terms of
accuracy and reaction times. This experimental paradigm seems
especially suitable to explore meaning modulation, as it requires
subjects not only to access the linguistic items but also to elabo-
rate and interpret their meanings at the level of detail that would
distinguish different senses (Klein and Murphy, 2001).
Below we will first present detailed background on the con-
struction of the stimulus material, i.e., a de novo built set of Italian
metaphors, metonymies and approximations with corresponding
literal and anomalous counterparts. Then, we describe a rating
study in which all sentences were normed for the major psy-
cholinguistic properties considered in the literature on figurative
language, namely meaningfulness, difficulty, cloze probability,
and familiarity, in order to obtain a pool of stimuli especially con-
trolled for their interpretability. Finally, we go back to the kinds
of conceptual adjustments and how they might result in different
sensicality judgment responses.
RATING STUDY
In building an experimental set of different pragmatic uses, two
major issues emerge: first the need to rule out possible con-
founding effects due to sentential and contextual environment,
and second the need to control for a number of psycholinguistic
variables that are well known to influence figurative language.
As for the first point, for each of the three pragmatic phenom-
ena under investigation (metaphor, metonymy and approxima-
tion) we constructed a set of Italian sentences of the form “That
Y verb X,” where X was the word triggering the pragmatic inter-
pretation and was taken as the target word for the experimental
measures. Given the well-documented role of context in facili-
tating figurative language processing (Gibbs, 1994; Schumacher,
2012), context was set to a minimal yet sufficient level for inter-
pretation across sets, in order to allow distinct pragmatic mecha-
nisms to emerge neatly. Literal and anomalous counterparts were
created for each set by selecting different subject nouns “Y” or
different verbs. All the anomalies contained a world knowledge
violation, as classically employed in language research (Kutas and
Hylliard, 1980; Cotelli et al., 2007). For the metaphor and approx-
imation sets, the anomalous condition resulted from the clash of
two incompatible semantic fields, while in the metonymy set the
anomalies are related to selectional properties of the lexicon, and
specifically of the verbs (see below for set specific criteria). It is
also possible to create world knowledge anomalies where all the
elements pertain to the same semantic fields and what is wrong
is the combination of them (for example, due to causal effects,
i.e., “to dry with water”). However, we left this type of anomaly
aside and we concentrated on most common anomalies based on
a semantic clash.
Among the many variables involved in figurative language,
the three sets were rated for meaningfulness, difficulty, cloze
probability, and familiarity. The importance of these variables
has been extensively described for metaphor processing (Kintsch
and Bowles, 2002; Cardillo et al., 2010), partially addressed for
metonymy processing (Frisson and Pickering, 1999), and never
explored for approximation. In the perspective of the timed sen-
sicality judgments to be collected afterwards, the main purpose
of this rating study was to assess the meaningfulness of the
experimental items, i.e., the interpretability of the sense of the
utterances, along with their difficulty, i.e., the overall ease of
interpretation.
As for familiarity, we aimed at setting a medium level of
familiarity for the pragmatic uses, in order to exclude both fully
conventionalized expressions—that could be processed as idioms
rather than through pragmatic adjustment—and highly creative
expressions—that could demand special pragmatic processes or
even result in senselessness. The familiarity dimension was dif-
ferently operationalized for each pragmatic phenomenon under
investigation. Following the main literature on metaphor, famil-
iarity was assessed by asking participants to rate frequency of
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experience for eachmetaphorical sentence. For themetonymy set,
we devised a world-knowledge task to control for both the famil-
iarity of the names used as target words and the familiarity of the
metonymic transfer for those names. For the approximation set,
a typicality task was used, where participants rated how appro-
priately the adjectives used as target words X qualify the subject
words Y.
Lastly, to ensure that context was kept minimal and equal
across conditions, we tested the contextual expectancy of each tar-
get word X for each sentence in the triplet and for all sets through
a cloze probability task.
METHODS
Participants
Eighty-five native speakers of Italian (42 F/43 M, mean age =
26.85 ± 3.80, mean schooling years = 18.02 ± 2.04 years of
education) participated in the rating study consisting in ques-
tionnaires with different tasks (see Sections Tasks and Procedure
below). Participants were unaware of the aim of the question-
naires and were not informed about the inclusion of figurative
language. They gave written consent to participate after receiving
an explanation of the procedures, according to the Declaration of
Helsinki.
Materials
For each phenomenon under consideration (metaphor,
metonymy, and approximation) we constructed a set of 48
triplets including sentences with the pragmatic use, literal, and
anomalous counterparts (henceforth, for the sake of brevity, the
label “pragmatic sentences” will be used to refer to the pragmatic
use condition for each set). The triplets were designed according
to the criteria below, resulting in a total pool of 432 sentences.
Table 1 shows an example of triplets from each set (Metaphor set,
Metonymy set, Approximation set).
Metaphor set
We constructed nominal metaphors where a noun X is the vehicle
for the metaphorical meaning (e.g., “Those dancers are butter-
flies”). For each noun, one literal sentence (e.g., “Those insects
are butterflies”) and one anomalous sentence (e.g., “Those bottles
are butterflies”) was created. Literal sentences were obtained by
using semantically compatible terms, while anomalous sentences
resulted from the clash of two semantically non-homogeneous
terms. Each sentence was constructed in such a way that the first
noun phrase (NP) was a subject and the second was a pred-
icate, that is only canonical copular sentences in the sense of
Moro (1997). This was made to exclude inverse copular construc-
tions which would have shifted the focus on the post-copular NP,
unbalancing the stimuli: e.g., in the canonical sentence “John was
the cause of the riot,” where the subject “John” precedes the pred-
icate “the cause of the riot,” “John” is not necessarily focused,
whereas in the inverse sentence “The cause of the riot was John,”
where the predicate “the cause of the riot” precedes the subject
“John,” “John” is necessarily focused, even if in both cases the
linear sequence is one and the same (NP V NP). Plural forms
were used in order to avoid predictability effects carried by the
gender-marked articles required in the singular forms.
Metonymy set
We built a set of producer-for-product metonymies, where proper
names of well-known Italian people were metonymically used
to refer to objects. Different types of producer for product shift
were used, such as author for book (e.g., “That student reads
Camilleri”), musician for song, designer for manufacture, painter
for painting. Proper nouns were used in order to create pro-
totypical metonymic uses, as proper names can be considered
clear cases of referring expressions that can be used metonymi-
cally. In order to control for the higher difficulty in processing
proper as compared to common nouns (Semenza, 2006), we car-
ried out a world knowledge rating tests (see the Section Tasks
below). In terms of Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez taxonomy (2007),
all metonymies were of the type target-in-source, i.e., the prod-
uct is a subdomain of the producer. Each proper name X was also
combined with different subject nouns (Ys) and different verbs,
resulting once in a literal sentence (e.g., “That journalist inter-
views Camilleri”) and once in an anomalous sentence (e.g., “That
chef cooks Camilleri”). In order to confinemetonymic interpreta-
tion to the target word, subject nouns and verbs were syntactically
and semantically congruent in all conditions. Anomalous sen-
tences resulted from the violation of selectional properties of the
lexicon, i.e., animate objects were used for verbs selecting inan-
imate objects. Names of presently popular Italian people (e.g.,
Camilleri, Vasco) were chosen instead of very famous people from
the past (e.g., Dante, Verdi) in order to reduce conventionality, as
it has been suggested that the use of famous names (e.g., Dickens)
in themetonymic formmight have become lexicalized in ordinary
language (Frisson and Pickering, 2007).
Table 1 | Examples of stimulus triplets for the Metaphor set, the Metonymy set, and the Approximation set.
Pragmatic Literal Anomalous
Metaphor set Quelle ballerine sono farfalle
Those dancers are butterflies
Quegli insetti sono farfalle
Those insects are butterflies
Quelle bottiglie sono farfalle
Those bottles are butterflies
Metonymy set Quello studente legge Camilleri
That student reads Camilleri
Quel giornalista intervista Camilleri
That reporter interviews Camilleri
Quel cuoco cucina Camilleri
That chef cooks Camilleri
Approximation set Quelle gomme sono lisce
Those tires are smooth
Quel marmo è liscio
That marble is smooth
Quei ristoranti sono lisci
Those restaurants are smooth
Original Italian; English translation in italics.
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Approximation set
Among the different cases of approximate uses (Wilson, 2003;
Wilson and Carston, 2006), we focused on adjectives. Following
the examples provided by Wilson and Carston (2007), four main
types of adjectives used in an approximate fashion were included:
sense-related (e.g., “Those tires are smooth”), geometric-related
(e.g., “Those sunglasses are rectangular”), color-related (e.g.,
“Those clouds are black”), and negative-related adjectives (e.g.,
“Those strawberries are tasteless”). For each target word X, we
created a literal sentence by selecting a prototypical exemplar hav-
ing the property described by the adjective (e.g., “Those marbles
are smooth”), and an anomalous sentence (e.g., “Those restau-
rants are smooth”). As in the metaphor set, anomalous condition
resulted from the clash of two semantically incompatible terms.
And as in the metaphor set, all sentences were copular construc-
tions in order to reduce morphological factors and get both the
subject and the predicate implemented with the same category.
Tasks
To characterize the sentence stimuli with respect to the major
psycholinguistic variables considered in the study of figurative
language, we designed a rating study consisting of computer-
mediated questionnaires including the following tasks:
Meaningfulness and difficulty tasks. We asked participants to
rate on a five-point Likert scale how meaningful each sentence
was (1 = meaningless; 5 = very meaningful). Each sentence was
presented one at a time, and participants selected the value of the
scale representing their judgment. Next, participants were asked
to rate how difficult it was to rate the meaningfulness for that
item, on a scale from 1 (very easy) to 5 (very difficult). All sets
were tested.
Familiarity task. For each item in the Metaphor set, participants
were instructed to indicate the frequency of experience with the
sentence on a Likert scale from 1 (very unfamiliar) to 5 (very
familiar).
World knowledge task. For each proper name used in the
Metonymy set, participants were instructed to associate the
proper name with the corresponding product, choosing between
four options. The options vary according to the type ofmetonymy
(e.g., for Camilleri, the options were: book/song/movie/painting).
This should account for both the familiarity of the proper names
and the familiarity of the producer-for-product transfer.
Typicality judgments task. We asked participants to indicate how
appropriate a given adjective (e.g., “smooth”) is to qualify three
different nouns (e.g., “marble,” “tires” and “restaurants”), which
corresponded to the nouns used in the triplet. A 5-point Likert
scale (1 = very inappropriate; 5 = very appropriate) was avail-
able for each noun. This should assess both the familiarity of the
approximate use and the literal use.
Cloze probability task. Each sentence was truncated before the
target word, and participants were asked to complete with the first
word that came to mind. All sets were tested.
Procedure
To preserve a high level of attention and avoid fatigue, two differ-
ent questionnaires were created. Questionnaire 1 included three
tasks: meaningfulness coupled with difficulty, world knowledge,
and typicality. Questionnaire 2 included cloze probability and
familiarity tasks. For each questionnaire, the pool of 432 sentences
was inserted into six different lists. Number of pragmatic, literal,
and anomalous sentences from each set was equally subdivided in
the different lists and tasks. The lists were rotated among tasks so
that each sentence was judged only once by each participant. The
order of the tasks was counterbalanced across participants using
a Latin Square procedure. Within each task the order of sentences
was randomized. One group of the participants completed one of
the six lists of Questionnaire 1, the other group completed one of
the six lists of Questionnaire 2 (number of data points per item
per task ≥ 6).
Ratings were administered online through Survey Monkey
software (SurveyMonkey.com, LCC, Palo Alto, California, USA,
www.surveymonkey.com). Each participant completed the ques-
tionnaire on a computer console, after giving informed consent
through the same on-line procedure and reading online instruc-
tions. Each questionnaire lasted approximately 30min.
RESULTS
Inclusion criteria
Since the main aim of the ratings was to ensure the interpretabil-
ity of the pragmatic sentences in untimed conditions for the
purpose of the timed sensicality judgment task, we excluded
pragmatic sentences for which both the following criteria were
satisfied: (i) median score equal to 1 for the meaningfulness scale
and median score > 3 for the difficulty scale; (ii) depending on
the set, for metaphors: median score equal to 5 or to 1 for the
familiarity scale; for metonymies: cases in which less than 80%
of participants correctly associated the producer with the corre-
sponding product; for approximation: approximations for which
the adjective-nouns pair scored< 2 (Mdn) on the typicality judg-
ment scale. Literal and anomalous counterparts of the excluded
pragmatic sentences were dropped as well.
From the original pool of sentences, 6 triplets were eliminated
from each set. Final stimuli comprised 42 triplets for each of the
3 sets, resulting in a total of 378 sentences (see Supplementary
Material). In the following, we only report rating results for
the final pool of sentences, to be further employed in the timed
sensicality task.
Linguistic measures
Since the target word X was constant in the pragmatic, literal,
and anomalous sentences of each triple, length, and frequency
were exactly balanced within each set. Length of the target
words was also balanced across sets [mean number of char-
acters: metaphor = 7.07; metonymy = 7.16; approximation =
7.49; F(2, 123) = 1.42, p = 0.24]. Frequency of the target words
were controlled for metaphor and approximation [mean log fre-
quency: metaphor = 1.51; approximation = 1.54; F(1, 82) = 0.43,
p = 0.83] based on a 3 million words database of written Italian,
fully lemmatized and annotated (Corpus e Lessico di Frequenza
dell’Italiano Scritto, CoLFIS, Bertinetto et al., 2005), available
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through the web interface EsploraCoLFIS (Bambini and Trevisan,
2012). No values were available in the database for the proper
names used in the metonymy sets. Ratings collected in the world
knowledge task should suffice as a measure of subjective fre-
quency (see below). Overall, average frequency based on the
values of all content words of the sentence was balanced across
sets [mean log frequency: metaphor = 1.92; metonymy = 1.85;
approximation = 2.04; F(2, 123) = 1.47, p = 0.23].
Rating results
We applied nonparametric methods since the assumptions
underlying the use of parametric tests were violated in our sets
(Knapp, 1990; Jamieson, 2004; Carifio and Perla, 2008; Norman,
2010). For descriptive statistics, we used median as a measure of
central tendency and interquartile range as a measure of disper-
sion. For each set, Kruskal–Wallis chi-squared test was performed
on raw data to assess whether there were overall differences across
pragmatic, literal and anomalous sentences (meaning modula-
tion factor). As post-hoc tests, we used Mann–Whitney U tests
with Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons (true alpha
level = 0.0167) to determine which of the three types of sentences
differed from each other. We also conducted parametric statistics
on rank transformed data (Conover and Iman, 1981). In all cases,
the results confirmed those obtained with the nonparametric pro-
cedure, and will not be reported in the results section. Table 2
presents descriptive statistics of the key psycholinguistic variables
computed for each set.
Furthermore, we complemented the inferential analyses set
by set by analyzing meaningfulness and difficulty scores across
the three sets through correspondence analysis (PASW Statistics
18.0.0 and R 2.13.0, “languageR” package, Baayen, 2011; see also
Baayen, 2008). The correspondence analysis is an explorative
computational method for interpreting categorical variables
(Greenacre, 1993), and it is capable of uncovering relationships
Table 2 | Descriptive statistics of rating scores for the Metaphor set,
the Metonymy set, and the Approximation set.
Pragmatic Literal Anomalous
Metaphor set Meaningfulness 4 (2–4) 4 (4–5) 1 (1–2)
Difficulty 2 (1–2) 1 (1–2) 1 (1–2)
Familiarity 3 (1–4) 4 (3–5) 1 (1–1)
Cloze probability 0.00% 0.39% 0.00%
Metonymy set Meaningfulness 4 (3–5) 5 (4–5) 1 (1–2)
Difficulty 1 (1–2) 1 (1–2) 1 (1–2)
World knowledge 90.29% – –
Cloze probability 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Approximation set Meaningfulness 4 (3–5) 5 (4–5) 2 (1–2)
Difficulty 1 (1–2) 1 (1–1) 2 (1–2)
Typicality 4 (3–4) 5 (4–5) 1 (1–1)
Cloze probability 1.66% 11.44% 0.39%
Median and interquartile range (in brackets) are reported for meaningfulness,
difficulty, and typicality tasks. Cloze probability and world knowledge results are
reported in percentage.
both among and between variables. Thus, it can be especially suit-
able for testing the relations between categorical variables such as
meaningfulness and difficulty.
The correspondence analysis tests the association between two
variables organized into a contingency table and seeks to pro-
vide a low dimensional map of the association between rows and
columns of the contingency table. In the present analysis, all sen-
tence stimuli were in rows, while Likert scores from 1 to 5 were in
columns. By means of this analysis, the dimension of the orig-
inal space is reduced, and an optimal subspace—closest to the
cloud of points in the chi square-metric—is found. The infor-
mation’s loss due to the dimension reduction is represented by
the inertia explained by the axes of the map. The number of
dimensions (hereafter called “factors,” according to Baayen, 2011)
needed to explain the variation in the data were determined by
using the scree plot. In the scree plot the factors’ eigenvalues were
plotted in order of magnitude from largest to smallest, and the
point where there was a marked drop in the amount of variation
explained was considered: only those factors with inertia contri-
bution higher than this point were selected for the interpretation.
Hence, the coordinates of both row and column points of the con-
tingency table were projected onto the selected low-dimensional
subspace. In this spatial map, row and column points that are
close together are more alike than points that are far apart. For
each factor, we also plotted the mean coordinates of the points
of each sentence type by means of bar plots in order to describe
the distribution of points with respect to the different types of
sentences across sets. Mean coordinates were then statistically
compared.
Metaphor set
Both metaphorical and literal sentences scored median 4 on the
meaningfulness scale (metaphorical: Mdn = 4, iqr = 2–4; lit-
eral: Mdn = 4, iqr = 4–5), while anomalous sentences were
rated as meaningless (Mdn = 1, iqr = 1–2). The effect of mean-
ing modulation (three levels: pragmatic, literal, anomalous) was
found significant [χ2(2) = 432.84, p < 0.001]. Metaphorical and
literal sentences significantly differed from anomalous counter-
parts (metaphorical vs. anomalous, p < 0.001; literal vs. anoma-
lous, p < 0.001). Although both metaphorical and literal scores
were in the upper end of the scale, statistically literal sentences
resulted more meaningful than metaphorical sentences (literal
vs. metaphorical, p < 0.001), probably due to a greater vari-
ability for metaphors. In all cases, participants formulated their
judgments about the sense/nonsense of the sentences with no
difficulty (metaphorical: Mdn = 2, iqr = 1–2; literal: Mdn =
1, iqr = 1–2; anomalous: Mdn = 1, iqr = 1–2), although there
was an effect of meaning modulation [χ2(2) = 29.59, p < 0.001],
due to higher scores for metaphor (metaphorical vs. literal,
p < 0.001; metaphorical vs. anomalous, p < 0.001). Familiarity
ratings showed that metaphorical sentences received medium
values (Mdn = 3, iqr = 1–4). Literal sentences scored higher
(Mdn = 4, iqr = 3–5), and the difference was significant [χ2(2) =
495.71, p < 0.001; literal vs. metaphorical, p < 0.001]. Cloze
probability was very low throughout the set, scoring 0.00% for
metaphorical and anomalous sentences, and 0.39% for literal
sentences.
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Metonymy set
Metonymic and literal sentences received high scores on the
meaningfulness scale (metonymic: Mdn = 4, iqr = 3–5; literal:
Mdn = 5, iqr = 4–5), while anomalous sentences scored median
1 (iqr = 1–2). Meaning modulation yielded a significant effect
[χ2(2) = 446.02, p < 0.001], with metonymic and literal items
more meaningful than anomalies (metonymic vs. anomalous,
p < 0.001; literal vs. anomalous, p < 0.001). As in the metaphor
set, scores for both the metonymic and the literal items were at
the upper end of the scale, but the comparison was significant
(literal vs. metonymy, p < 0.001). Difficulty was very low across
conditions (in all cases, Mdn = 1, iqr = 1–2). Nevertheless, we
observed an effect of meaning modulation [χ2(2) = 14.69, p <
0.001], and the comparison between metonymies and literal sen-
tences was significant (p < 0.001). World knowledge task showed
that participants correctly associated the producer with the prod-
uct (accuracy = 90.29%). Cloze probability was 0.00% for any
version of any item.
Approximation set
On the meaningfulness scale, both approximations and lit-
eral sentences received high scores, while anomalous sentences
received low scores (approximate: Mdn = 4, iqr = 3–5; literal:
Mdn = 5, iqr = 4–5; anomalous: Mdn = 2, iqr = 1–2). A sig-
nificant effect of meaning modulation was found [χ2(2) = 451.60,
p < 0.001]: both approximation and literal sentences were judged
more meaningful than anomalies (approximate vs. anomalous,
p < 0.001; literal vs. anomalous, p < 0.001). Consistently with
findings on metaphor and metonymy, literal sentences were more
meaningful than approximation sentences (p < 0.001). Difficulty
was low throughout the set (approximate: Mdn = 1, iqr = 1–2;
literal: Mdn = 1, iqr = 1–1; anomalous: Mdn = 2, iqr = 1–2),
although the comparison between approximation and literal sen-
tences reached significance (χ2(2) = 101.89, p < 0.001). Results
of the typicality task showed that the adjectives were judged
moderately appropriate when referred to the nouns used in the
approximations (Mdn = 4, iqr = 3–4), and fully appropriate
when referred to the nouns used in the literal sentences (Mdn =
5, iqr= 4–5), while they were rated inappropriate in combination
with the nouns from the anomalous sentences (Mdn = 1, iqr =
1–1). All comparisons were significant [χ2(2) = 560.61, p < 0.001;
p’s < 0.001]. Cloze probability remained below the threshold of
12%, with averaged values of 1.66% for approximations, 11.44%
for literal, and 0.39% for anomalous expressions.
Meaningfulness and difficulty across sets
A synthetic view of the similarity among the different types of sen-
tences across sets with respect to meaningfulness and difficulty
is provided through the correspondence analysis. For meaning-
fulness, a correspondence analysis with all the sentence stimuli
across the three sets as one variable and Likert scores as the other
variable was performed. A significant model was generated and
the chi-squared test revealed a significant association between
variables [χ2(1508) = 3437.10, p < 0.001]. The scree plot revealed
a marked decrease in the proportion of inertia explained by the
second and subsequent eigenvalues; accordingly, only the first fac-
tor was considered to be interpreted. The first factor, accounting
for 49.87% of the total inertia, roughly revealed a segregation of
the different types of sentences into two clusters: literal and prag-
matic sentences belonging to the three sets are on the left side of
the map, whereas all anomalous sentences are on the right side
(Figure 1). Hence, the first factor seems to indicate that all prag-
matic and literal sentences were similarly scored on the mean-
ingfulness scale. Anomalous sentences differed from pragmatic
and literal ones, being collocated apart. It can also be observed
that, among meaningful sentences, on the one hand literal sen-
tences were clustered together, on the other hand approximate,
metonymic and metaphorical sentences were close together. By
statistically comparing themean coordinates along the first factor,
a significant difference was found between anomalous and both
pragmatic and literal sentences [F(2, 375) = 987.40, p < 0.001;
Bonferroni post-hoc comparisons, ps < 0.001]. Significant dif-
ference was also found between literal and pragmatic sentences
(Bonferroni post-hoc comparisons, p = 0.002). Considering the
first factor with respect to the Likert scores, we observed that it
was organized from right to left according to the ascending order
of the Likert scale values.
The correspondence analysis was also applied to difficulty
ratings. A significant model was generated [χ2(1508) = 2067.82,
p < 0.001]. The resulting scree plot revealed a marked decrease
in the proportion of inertia explained by the third and subse-
quent eigenvalues; hence, the first factor (explaining the 33.41%
of the total inertia) and the second factor (explaining the 26.61%
of the total inertia) were interpreted. As shown in Figure 2, the
majority of sentences were close together, clustered in the upper
part of the plot, suggesting that sentences were almost perceived
as similarly difficult to be understood. However, upon a closer
inspection, the first factor seems to reveal a distinction between
literal sentences (on the right side) and anomalous ones (on the
left side). Pragmatic sentences showed a more dispersed distri-
bution, with metaphors mainly distributed on the left side and
approximations mainly distributed on the right side of the map.
By statistically comparing the coordinates along the first fac-
tor, literal sentences significantly differ from both pragmatic and
anomalous sentences [F(2, 375) = 27.50, p < 0.001; Bonferroni
post-hoc comparisons: pragmatic vs. literal, p < 0.001; anoma-
lous vs. literal, p < 0.001]. With respect to the Likert scores, we
observed a separation between score 1 and all other score values.
By visually inspecting the second factor, we observed a rough
separation of literal and pragmatic sentences (in the upper half of
the map) from anomalous sentences (on the bottom half of the
map), thus, most likely reflecting the similarity between literal
and pragmatic sentences as compared to anomalous ones. This
interpretation was further supported by the statistical analysis on
the mean coordinates on the second factor [F(2, 375) = 27.16, p <
0.001; Bonferroni post-hoc comparisons: pragmatic vs. anoma-
lous, p < 0.001; literal vs. anomalous, p < 0.001; pragmatic vs.
literal, p = 0.38].
DISCUSSION
Through a rating procedure, we built a set of tightly controlled
metaphorical, metonymic, and approximate uses (and literal and
anomalous counterparts) based on the same sentence structure
“That X verb Y,” characterized in terms of meaningfulness and
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FIGURE 1 | Correspondence analysis for meaningfulness rating scores.
The 378 sentences belonging to the three sets (Metaphor set = MP;
Metonymy set = MT; Approximation set = AP) and the 5 Likert points are
plotted at their corresponding coordinates. MP_MP: Metaphor
set—metaphorical sentences; MP_L: Metaphor set—literal sentences;
MP_A: Metaphor set—anomalous sentences; MT_MT: Metonymy
set—metonymic sentences; MT_L: Metonymy set—literal sentences; MT_A:
Metonymy set—anomalous sentences; AP_AP: Approximation
set—approximate sentences; AP_L: Approximation set—literal sentences;
AP_A: Approximation set—anomalous sentences. Pragmatic sentences are
shown in magenta (MP_MP = magenta; MT_MT = dark magenta; AP_AP =
light magenta); literal sentences are shown in blue (MP_L = blue; MT_L =
dark blue; AP_L = light blue); anomalous sentences are shown in gray
(MP_A = gray; MT_A = dark gray; AP_L = light gray). Barplots indicate mean
coordinates for each factor and sentence types; error bars indicate standard
error means.
difficulty. For each set, inferential analysis revealed that both
pragmatic and literal sentences were rated as meaningful and dif-
ferently from anomalous sentences, thus, excluding the possibility
that pragmatic items are interpreted as anomalous. Inferential
analysis also pointed out differences within the group ofmeaning-
ful sentences. Although pragmatic sentences were judged inter-
pretable (with high median scores for meaningfulness and low
median score for difficulty), literal uses score higher in mean-
ingfulness and lower in difficulty than pragmatic uses. This is
probably related to the fact that the context prompting prag-
matic mechanisms to emerge is a minimal one. However, these
differences do not seem to jeopardize the general consistency of
the sets. Accordingly, the correspondence analysis on meaning-
fulness shows that literal and pragmatic sentences of the three
sets clustered together and were judged similarly for meaningful-
ness, clearly differing from anomalous sentences. It also showed
the similarity among all pragmatic uses, as opposed to all literal
counterparts. Furthermore, all sentences were judged similarly on
the difficulty scale, suggesting that our stimuli were all easily inter-
pretable although some specific characteristics are revealed. All
literal sentences, regardless the specific set, resulted overall easy to
be interpreted. More importantly, literal and pragmatic uses were
similar for difficulty and different from anomalous sentences.
All pragmatic uses were also controlled for familiarity.
Metaphorical sentences received medium scores on the famil-
iarity scale, which suggests that they were perceived neither as
fully conventionalized nor as extremely creative. Likewise, for
metonymy, participants correctly associated the proper names
of the producers to the corresponding product, thus, implicitly
demonstrating the familiarity of the names and of the metonymic
transfer, although not fully lexicalized. For approximation, data
suggested that the selected adjectives where judged appropriate
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FIGURE 2 | Correspondence analysis for difficulty rating scores. Labels as in Figure 1.
when referred to the nouns used in the approximations, yet
less typical than when used literally, providing first quantitative
evidence for the definition of the category of approximation.
The set of stimuli also appears to be well controlled for the
contextual expectancy: cloze probability was very low across sets,
never above 12.00% for any condition of any sets. Interestingly,
participants never created metaphor nor approximation in com-
pleting the sentences. Strictly speaking, also for metonymy the
cloze probability was equal to zero. However, we observed 7 cases
in which the final word reported by the participants was a proper
name, albeit different from the one used in the corresponding
stimulus (e.g., original stimulus: “That writer translates Fruttero”;
cloze probability results: “That writer translates. . .Hesse/Sartre”).
These results highlighted that there were some verbs sponta-
neously used in their metonymic sense, while the probability
of creating a metaphor or an approximation was not verified,
suggesting that metonymy is somehow more prone to routiniza-
tion.
Overall, the result of the ratings allows us to assume that
potential differences in processing pragmatic and literal sentences
in the timed sensicality judgments will not depend on signifi-
cant psycholinguistic differences of materials, but will truly reflect
distinct interpretations for the three phenomena.
As a final note, one may argue that target words had
different syntactic functions across sets, being used pred-
icatively in metaphor and approximation, and referentially
in the case of metonymy. However, we believe that it was
important to focus on standard uses of the three prag-
matic phenomena, rather than maintaining the same target
word at the price of less clear and prototypical pragmatic
types.
TIMED SENSICALITY JUDGMENT STUDY
Timed sensicality judgment task has been used as a valu-
able paradigm to explore interpretation assignment, at differ-
ent levels of the linguistic structure. This paradigm has been
widely employed in investigations targeting conceptual oper-
ations, including polysemy (Klein and Murphy, 2001) and
compounding (Gagné, 2001). At the sentence level, sensicality
judgments have been used to explore pragmatic interpretation of
conjunctions (Bott et al., 2009) and processing literal, metaphor-
ical and idiomatic expressions containing actions verbs (Cacciari
and Pesciarelli, 2013). The advantage of the sensicality judgment
task is that it requires not only to access but also to elabo-
rate the meaning of the expression. Information can be gathered
both on the availability of the correct interpretation under time
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pressure (measured in terms of accuracy, i.e., proportion of cor-
rect responses—judging a sensible expression to be sensical or
a non-sense expression to be non-sensical) and on the costs of
interpretation (measured in terms of latencies). Interestingly, sen-
sicality judgments often recur as behavioral task in a number
of experimental paradigms targeting figurative language process-
ing, from Speed-Accuracy Tradeoff (McElree and Nordlie, 1999)
to neurophysiological and neuroimaging studies (Arzouan et al.,
2007; Lai et al., 2009; Rapp et al., 2011; Subramaniam et al., 2012).
Here we used timed sensicality judgments to explore inter-
pretation assignment of different types of pragmatic uses (i.e.,
metaphor, metonymy and approximation) compared to literal
counterparts. It could be hypothesized that: (i) the greater mean-
ing modulation required by loose uses compared to literal uses
might reflect in higher interpretation costs for both metaphorical
and approximate expressions compared to literal expressions; (ii)
in turn, the greater meaning modulation required by metaphor
compared with approximation (broadening + narrowing vs.
only narrowing) might reflect in higher interpretation costs for
metaphorical relative to approximate expressions; (iii) as for
metonymy, being based on a different conceptual operation with
respect to metaphor and approximation, and being more subject
to routinization, it is possible that no additional interpretation
costs are required with respect to literal interpretation.
METHODS
Participants
Twenty-five native speakers of Italian (12 M/13 F; mean age =
25.32 ± 3.02 years; mean schooling years = 18.3 ± 3.03) partic-
ipated in the study. Participants were unaware of the aim of the
study, and not experts in linguistics or psycholinguistics. None
of them had participated in the rating study. They gave written
consent to participate after receiving an explanation of the pro-
cedures, according to the Declaration of Helsinki, and received a
monetary reimbursement for their participation.
Materials
The final pool of sentences described in the previous section was
used as stimuli, i.e., 42 triplets for each set (Metaphor, Metonymy,
Approximation). An additional 42 anomalous sentences were
included for each set, with the purpose of having a similar ratio of
sense and non-sense items. In order to minimize potential effects
related to the repetition of the target words X in the triplets, the
additional items recombined other words in the set, partly by
repeating the subject nouns Y (e.g., “Those insects are tables,”
where “insects” is the subject noun in the literal version of one
triplet in the metaphor set; see Table 1) and partly by repeat-
ing the last word of the additional item (e.g., “Those trousers
are tables,” where “tables” is the last word of the additional item
obtained as above). Furthermore, to reduce the proportion of
pragmatically used words and avoid metalinguistic awareness on
figurative language, the experimental items were intermixed with
594 fillers (66% sense, 33% non-sense), consisting of four word
sentences, like the experimental stimuli. In total, there was a
sense:non-sense ratio of 1.44:1, and pragmatic sentences repre-
sented 12.0% of the stimuli (4.0% metaphors, 4.0% metonymies,
and 4.0% approximations).
Procedure
Each participant was tested individually. Stimulus presenta-
tion and response collection were all carried out on a per-
sonal computer, using Presentation© software (Version 14.9,
www.neurobs.com). Each trial began with a fixation cross pre-
sented in the middle of the screen for 500ms. Next, the sentence
was presented word by word at a fixed rate (300ms). After the
final word, YES/NO appeared on the screen to indicate that par-
ticipants could give their response. Participants were instructed
to respond as quickly and accurately as possible, and to make
a sensicality judgment by pressing the green button when the
string was meaningful and the red button when the sentence
was meaningless on an RB 530 response pad (SuperLab Pro,
Cedrus Corporation). The assignment of red and green to the
left and right keys was counterbalanced across participants. After
response or time-out (4000ms), there was a blank inter-trial
interval of 1000ms. Response times were measured from the
offset of the target word X.
Each subject was presented with all sentences. To avoid
fatigue, three experimental blocks were created. An equal num-
ber of pragmatic, literal, and anomalous sentences from each
set were included in each block, along with an equal num-
ber of fillers. We assigned the members of each triplet and the
additional anomalous counterpart to distinct blocks, in order
to avoid long-distance priming effects. Within each block, sen-
tences were presented in a random order, while the order of the
block was pseudo-randomized across participants. Mandatory
stops between experimental blocks were fixed. A training session
including 10 items preceded the experiment. Furthermore, two
practice trials (not included in the analysis) were administered
at the beginning of each block. Overall the experimental session
lasted 1 h.
RESULTS
Responses faster than 250ms and slower than 1750ms were
excluded from the analysis (10.4% of the data). We also excluded
data by two participants with overall accuracy rate lower than
80%, and by one participant with 40% of responses faster than
250ms. We observed that for the Metaphor set one participant
never answered correctly for metaphors. However, he was not
excluded from the analysis as his overall level of accuracy was
higher than the 80% threshold. Similarly, one metaphorical item
was never judged accurately, but it was not excluded from the
analysis based on the results of the rating study. In Table 3 accu-
racy rates and mean reaction times for correct responses for each
experimental condition are reported.
Accuracy
A Univariate General Linear Model with meaning modulation
(three levels: pragmatic, literal, anomalous) and set type (three
levels: metaphor set, metonymy set, approximation set) as fixed
factors was carried out on accuracy rates, treating either subjects
(F1) or items (F2) as a random factor. Results showed that both
the meaning modulation factor [F1 (2, 168) = 60.74, p < 0.001;
F2 (2, 328) = 68.98, p < 0.001] and the set type factor [F1 (2, 168) =
10.74, p < 0.001; F2 (2, 328) = 12.41, p < 0.001] were significant.
Also their interaction was significant [F1 (4, 168) = 32.33 p <
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Table 3 | Accuracy rates and mean reaction times (ms) for correct responses as a function of pragmatic modulation (pragmatic, literal,
anomalous conditions) and set type (Metaphor set, Metonymy set, Approximation set).
Metaphor set Metonymy set Approximation set
Accuracy Reaction time Accuracy Reaction time Accuracy Reaction time
Pragmatic 0.52 (0.24) 744.66 (339.02) 0.83 (0.10) 688.70 (338.17) 0.87 (0.09) 655.96 (308.82)
Literal 0.95 (0.04) 638.10 (305.05) 0.89 (0.07) 658.32 (326.55) 0.95 (0.04) 591.13 (293.18)
Anomalous 0.97 (0.05) 653.98 (339.44) 0.95 (0.06) 669.01 (332.04) 0.85 (0.16) 673.37 (333.20)
Standard deviations in parentheses.
0.001; F2 (4, 328) = 37.47, p < 0.001], indicating that the effect
of one factor depends on the level of the other factor. We
therefore, explored the effect of meaning modulation set by
set by carrying out a separate ANOVA for each set, with a
focus on the comparison between the pragmatic and the lit-
eral sentences. In the Metaphor set, this factor yielded signifi-
cant effects [F1 (2, 42) = 68.43, p < 0.001; F2 (2, 82) = 100.77, p <
0.001], with metaphorical sentences being less accurate than lit-
eral sentences (Bonferroni post-hoc comparisons, ps < 0.001 both
by subjects and by items). Also in the Metonymy set, mean-
ing modulation was significant [F1 (2, 42) = 12.73, p < 0.001;
F2 (2, 82) = 8.10, p = 0.001]. In contrast to the Metaphor set,
however, accuracy doesn’t seem to vary for metonymic and lit-
eral sentences: post-hoc comparisons revealed only a marginal
difference between the two conditions (Bonferroni post-hoc com-
parisons, p = 0.05 in the by subject analysis, p = 0.18 in the
by item analysis). In the Approximation set, again we observed
a main effect of meaning modulation [F1 (2, 42) = 3.94, p =
0.02; F2 (2, 82) = 8.49, p = 0.001]. Accuracy for approximation
was significantly lower than for literal sentences in the by item
analysis (Bonferroni post-hoc comparisons, p = 0.006), although
the difference was not significant in the by subject analysis
(Bonferroni post-hoc comparisons, p = 0.12). Overall, the data
suggest a higher availability of literal uses as compared to
metaphor and—to a lesser degree—approximation, but not for
metonymy.
Latencies
Following the standard in analyzing response times, only trials
in which participants responded correctly were included in the
analysis.
The effect of meaning modulation (three levels: pragmatic
vs. literal vs. anomalous) and set type (three levels: Metaphor
set, Metonymy set, Approximation set) on response times were
examined with Univariate General Linear Model treating either
subjects (F1) or items (F2) as a random factor. We observed
a significant effect of meaning modulation [F1(2, 167) = 12.23,
p < 0.001; F2(2, 327) = 24.97, p < 0.001], as well as a significant
effect of set type in the by item analysis and marginally sig-
nificant in the by subject analysis [F1(2, 167) = 2.95, p = 0.05;
F2(2, 327) = 9.46, p < 0.001]. A significant interaction between
meaning modulation and set type was found [F1(4, 167) = 3.77,
p = 0.006; F2(4, 327) = 8.70, p < 0.001], as shown in Figure 3.
In order to explore the interaction of meaning modulation and
set type, simple effect analyses were conducted. As concerns the
FIGURE 3 | Mean reaction times (ms) for the Approximation set, the
Metaphor set, and the Metonymy set as a function of the meaning
modulation factor. Pragmatic level is represented by the solid line, literal
level by the dashed line, and anomalous level by the dotted line. Error bars
indicate standard error.
meaning modulation factor, in the Metaphor set we observed
that metaphorical sentences were interpreted slower than literal
counterparts [F1 (2, 41) = 5.85, p = 0.006; F2 (2, 81) = 25.51, p <
0.001; Bonferroni post-hoc comparisons, p < 0.05 in the by sub-
jects, p < 0.001 in the by items analysis]. On the contrary, in
the Metonymy set there were no differences across conditions
[F1 (2, 42) = 0.74, p = 0.48; F2 (2, 82) = 2.06, p = 0.13], indicat-
ing that metonymic interpretation was reached as rapidly as literal
interpretation. Similarly to the Metaphor set, the Approximation
set showed a significant effect of the meaning modulation fac-
tor [F1 (2, 42) = 10.66, p < 0.001; F2 (2, 82) = 8.37, p < 0.001],
with approximations interpreted slower than literal sentences
(Bonferroni post-hoc comparisons, p = 0.006 in the by subjects,
p = 0.003 in the by items analysis).
We also assessed whether the type of pragmatic use has an
effect on response times. Since pragmatic sentences differ in some
respects—as needed to preserve clear pragmatic types, we avoided
direct comparisons of metaphors, metonymies, and approxima-
tions across sets. Rather, we measured the latency difference
between the pragmatic condition and the literal condition for the
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corrected pairs of each set: (metaphor—literal), (metonymy—
literal), and (approximation—literal), as represented in Figure 4.
The highest latency difference was obtained for metaphor
(Mmetaphor − literal = 105.34ms), followed by approximation
(Mapproximation − literal = 78.50ms), while a minimal latency
difference was observed for metonymy (Mmetonymy − literal =
2.76ms). The comparison reveals an effect of the type of prag-
matic use [F(2, 41) = 14.14, p < 0.001], with metaphor and
approximation significantly different from metonymy, but not
different from each other (Bonferroni post-hoc comparisons:
metaphor/approximation vs. metonymy, p = 0.001; metaphor vs.
approximation, p = 0.92).
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The results of the rating study indicated that the three pragmatic
uses were easily interpreted as meaningful in a manner similar to
the corresponding literal constructions. More specifically, mean-
ingfulness and difficulty ratings pointed toward similar behavior
of all pragmatic uses (metaphors, metonymies, approximations)
and the literal sentences as opposed to anomalous sentences.
Despite some differences in the inferential statistics between lit-
eral uses and single pragmatic uses, the correspondence analysis
showed that the literal and pragmatic uses behave alike in differ-
ing from anomalies. Importantly, the observed difference between
the literal and figurative in the inferential analysis was consis-
tent across metaphor, metonymy, and approximation sets, i.e.,
in all cases pragmatic sentences exhibited a similar behavior as
opposed to literal sentences. By characterizing sentences with
respect to several psycholinguistic dimensions, we provided mea-
sures that may guide the selection of stimuli in future studies (see
Supplementary Material).
While the rating study indicates similarity in the mean-
ingfulness and difficulty of the various pragmatic uses, timed
sensicality judgments revealed that there are differences across
FIGURE 4 | Reaction times differences (pragmatic minus literal) for the
Approximation set, the Metaphor set, and the Metonymy set. Error
bars correspond to the standard error of the difference for each set.
metaphor, metonymy, and approximation, reflected both in accu-
racy rates and response latencies during interpretation. Extending
the current theoretical models into experimental predictions, we
expected (i) metaphors and approximations to exhibit higher
interpretation costs with respect to literal interpretation; (ii)
metaphors to be more costly with respect to approximations; and
(iii) metonymies to behave differently, possibly in the direction
of no additional costs with respect to literal interpretation. Our
results seem to confirm these predictions and to show differences
across the three pragmatic phenomena, reflected both in accuracy
and response times.
First, meaning modulation (i.e., whether the expression was
pragmatic, literal, or anomalous) significantly affects the accu-
racy of the response. Assigning a pragmatic interpretation under
the pressure of time seems to be more difficult than construct-
ing a literal interpretation. There are, however, notable differences
across pragmatic uses. For metaphor, the percentage of correct
responses was around 50%. Although judged as meaningful in
the offline rating, in timed sensicality judgments, metaphors
proved significantly more difficult to interpret than literal expres-
sions. This piece of evidence is consistent with previous research
employing sensicality judgments in a variety of paradigms, from
Speed Accuracy Tradeoff (McElree and Nordlie, 1999) to neuro-
physiological recording (Arzouan et al., 2007) and neuroimag-
ing (Subramaniam et al., 2012). Accuracy around chance seems
thus, a common performance associated with the interpreta-
tion of nominal metaphor in speeded condition. Participants
performed much better when they were presented with approx-
imations and metonymies, reaching 87 and 83%, respectively.
This suggests higher availability for approximate and metonymic
uses with respect to metaphorical use. Interestingly, we observed
that metaphors and approximations—although less clearly—are
interpreted less accurately than their literal counterparts, while
there is a marginal or no difference between metonymies and
literal expressions. This points in the direction of similarities in
the interpretation style of metaphor and approximation, although
associated with different degrees of availability. In turn, the avail-
ability of metonymy seems to equate that of literal interpretation.
It should be noted that in the Metonymy set literal sentences
reached only 89% accuracy, which is lower than accuracy literal
sentences in other sets. This is probably related to the costs of
processing proper names, which require the retrieval of stored
knowledge (see Gorno-Tempini et al., 1998), also when they
are well-known by the participants (as assessed in the rating
study). However, this should not affect the comparison between
metonymies and literal controls, as proper names were included
in both conditions and their presence should not block interpre-
tative differences to emerge, if any. At the same time, there is
experimental evidence that common and proper nouns are sup-
ported by different functional and anatomical paths (Semenza,
2006). In this sense, the impact of proper nouns on process-
ing metonymical expressions as compared to metaphorical and
approximate uses cannot be accounted for in the present study,
and may require further investigations.
Second, pragmatic interpretation also reflects in time.
Analyzing error-free trials, i.e., limiting the analysis to those
cases where pragmatic sentences were judged to be sensical, we
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observed that interpreting pragmatic uses is not always slower
than literal interpretation. This is the case for metaphor and
approximation, but not for metonymy. These findings accord
with behavioral literature on metaphor showing that, in mini-
mal context and for not conventionalized expressions, metaphor
processing requires extra costs compared to literal processing
(Noveck et al., 2001). Here, we carefully controlled the sentential
environment, by providing each pragmatic use with a minimal
context, and the familiarity of the expressions, by avoiding lex-
icalized cases. Thus, the higher reaction times for metaphors
seem to truly reflect extra costs required by the interpretation of
metaphorically used words as compared to literal uses.
Results are also consistent with eye-tracking studies report-
ing no differences between metonymic and literal expressions
(Frisson and Pickering, 1999; Pickering et al., 2004). It cannot go
unnoticed, however, that, at the neural level, metonymic expres-
sions elicit robust differences from literal comprehension (Rapp
et al., 2011; Schumacher, 2011, 2013). It is up to future studies
to elucidate whether this discrepancy is motivated by differences
in the materials, either in conventionality or supportive context,
or in the methodological techniques and the type of informa-
tion they offer. Our view is that, when metonymy—like in our
case—is based on common shifts such as producer for product, no
matter the relative conventionality of the specific lexical items, in
a minimal yet sufficient context, interpretation costs in speeded
conditions closely mirror literal comprehension, and radically
differ from those required by metaphor processing.
Besides, this view is consistent with findings reported for other
types of routinized meaning shift. For example, sensicality judg-
ments on logical metonymy showed no differences in accuracy
nor in latencies between the coerced and control conditions, yet
again evoking neural differences (Brennan and Pylkkänen, 2008).
By contrast, our results seem to be conflicting with the higher
reading times for resolving metonymic referring expressions as
compared to metaphorical referents presented in Gibbs (1990).
However, those data are controversial, as potentially affected by
the plausibility of the items (Frisson and Pickering, 1999), and
obscuring some comparisons of interest (Noveck et al., 2001).The
different patterns observed for metaphor and metonymy gains
support from the results on approximation. We showed that
adjectives used approximately are interpreted slower than the
same adjectives used literally. This piece of evidence seems to
place approximation closer to metaphor than to metonymy. This
result seems to strengthen the distinction between the process-
ing styles for metaphor and for metonymy, by introducing a third
case that patterns like the former but differently from the latter.
Consonant with this are also the latency differences between the
pragmatic and the literal conditions across sets. When we disen-
tangle the costs of interpreting each type of pragmatic use, we see
that approximation and metaphor are associated with extra costs,
while metonymy doesn’t prompt extra effort. Accuracy data, with
metaphor and approximation as well (although to a lesser degree)
departing from literality, and metonymy tending to equate it, are
in harmony.
Collectively, this pattern of results carries importance for
discussing theoretical accounts of the nature of pragmatic
phenomena. The relevance-theoretic claim that metaphor and
approximation both require conceptual adjusting of the linguis-
tically encoded concept but in different degrees (Wilson, 2003)
seems to be supported by our data, and specifically by the gradi-
ent observed in availability and latency. Also the direction of the
conceptual adjustment may contribute to the different gradient
observed in the sensicality judgments. According to Carston and
Wearing (2011), hyperbole, is considered as a case of marginal
broadening as opposed to metaphor involving a broadening
coupled with narrowing. Extending this proposal further, also
approximation could be taken as a case of marginal broadening
(possibly more marginal than in hyperbole) as opposed to the
combination of broadening and narrowing supporting metaphor.
According to this interpretation, higher difficulty and costs for
metaphor compared to approximation might stem from a more
complex operation—broadening and narrowing—with respect to
the marginal broadening required for approximation processing.
For the type of task used here, we do not have direct evidence to
discriminate whether the difference between approximation and
metaphor lays in marginal vs. radical broadening or in marginal
broadening vs. a combination of radical broadening and narrow-
ing. Intuitively, our data fit well with the degree claim posited
by Relevance Theory, while the direction claim is less straightfor-
wardly answerable.More sophisticated designs will be needed that
manipulate the (degree of) direction of the adjustment, possibly
exploring the temporal dynamics of the process or the concep-
tual properties that undergo manipulation. Granted this caveat,
the general idea of a modulation in the underlying conceptual
adjustment process seems to be well supported by our findings.
Converging evidence comes from Deamer et al.’s (2010) reading
time study, where hyperbolic uses were compared tometaphorical
uses, showing that even a more substantial type of broaden-
ing such as hyperbole is distinct from metaphor. This study
actually failed in finding a difference between hyperboles and
literal expressions. This discrepancy is possibly related to contex-
tual modulation: Deamer et al. (2010) used supportive contexts
that might have facilitated hyperbole resolution and reduced the
broadening, while we used a minimal sentential environment that
allowed for the marginal extra costs required by approximation to
emerge.
Also the hypothesis put forward in Carston (2010), i.e., that
metonymy is not straightforwardly reducible to narrowing or
broadening but involves some kind of shift, seems to fit with our
data. The different pattern of results observed for metonymy as
opposed to metaphor might reflect different conceptual opera-
tions. Some support for this interpretation comes from acqui-
sition data showing that metonymy not only is acquired at a
faster rate than metaphor, but it also processed more accu-
rately throughout childhood to adulthood (Rundblad and Annaz,
2010). In order to explain this finding, Rundblad and Annaz
(2010) hypothesized a more basic type of conceptual operation
for metonymy as opposed to metaphor. Similarly, a contiguity
vs. property relation was assumed to motivate different behav-
iors in aphasic patients (Bisiacchi et al., 1976; Semenza et al.,
1980). Neuropsychologial data suggested that the processing of
class vs. thematic relationships rely, at least in part, on partially
independent neural substrates, being associated with posterior
and anterior lesions, respectively (Semenza et al., 1992).
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The results described for metonymy can also be recon-
ciled with the Cognitive Linguistics account, to the extent that
metaphor and metonymy are ascribed to distinct types of map-
pings: across domains for metaphor, within the same domain
for metonymy. A greater cognitive distance between concepts can
be assumed for metaphor (see also Rundblad and Annaz, 2010)
and might be reflected in higher difficulty and costs. As it is still
difficult to translate the different types of mappings in terms of
processing costs, we leave this for further research to develop.
Our data also point to reduced efforts for metonymy, and to
the routinization of some types of metonymic shifts, such as pro-
ducer for product. It might be of some interest here to report some
qualitative insights from the post-experiment session: despite the
very low percentage of metaphors in the sentence pool, some
participants noticed their presence, while none seemed to notice
metonymy, as if metonymic uses were more integrated in the lex-
ical knowledge and less prominent in the speakers’ metalinguistic
awareness. Interestingly, in a developmental study, Annaz et al.
(2009) observed a correlation of metonymic comprehension with
the expansion of receptive vocabulary that might suggest that in
some cases metonymic meanings might be part of the lexicon.
According to these observations, a possible distinction might
be sketched between the combination of broadening and nar-
rowing on the metaphor side, less pre-configured in direction
and degree of the conceptual adjustment of the lexical concept,
and conceptual shift on the metonymy side, based on more rou-
tinized patterns. In other words, metonymy seems to have a more
direct relation with the lexical meaning and is much less arbitrary
than metaphor. Highly creative metonymic uses are possible as
well (consider, for instance, “The best pencils of the world gather
together for the annual drawing convention”), and this might call
upon higher interpretation costs. However, it seems psychologi-
cally implausible to posit different elaboration procedures for the
same class of phenomena, as the difference between routinized
producer for product cases and less typical tool for worker cases
could probably be made not by different types of conceptual
adjustment processes, but rather by the role of context.
As a final consideration, sensicality judgments are a goodmea-
sure of the availability and difficulty of correct interpretation,
but are limited to stages where the sense has already been con-
strued, and do not account for online processing nor for the type
of process involved (Frisson, 2009). Thus, our results shed light
on the costs of interpretation assignment, and provide insights
into interpretative style, but further investigations are needed to
explore the temporal dynamics and the nature of the conceptual
operations involved.
CONCLUSIONS
Behind a label such as figurative language, many different mech-
anisms are grouped. Although we assume that all require prag-
matic inferencing to be interpreted, interpretation might come
with different procedures, linked to different operations at the
conceptual level. Through timed sensicality judgments recorded
for different pragmatic uses in minimal context condition, we
found that there are significant differences in the interpreta-
tion availability and costs of metaphor, metonymy, and approx-
imation. The findings support a theoretical distinction between
metaphor and approximation, which seem to vary in degree and
possibly in the direction of the underlying adjustment process,
compatible with Relevance Theory, and an even more marked
separation with metonymy, whose meaning shift might be subject
to routinization.
With these data, we hope to have strengthened the empirical
basis available on figurative language, by providing the first evi-
dence in favor of the psychological reality of the phenomenon of
approximation, and with a first attempt to answer the challenge
raised by metonymy. We believe that deepening the understand-
ing of the phenomena included under the realm of pragmatics, by
pinpointing potential differences for the parser and elaborating
on whether natural classes of cases can be identified on this basis,
is one promising line of research for the experimental pragmatics
enterprise.
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